Achieving Critical Mass: Trump Administration Policies that Would Strengthen Nuclear Energy
A second Trump administration has the opportunity to cement nuclear energy as a pillar of U.S. energy dominance and global competitiveness.
In his first term, President Donald Trump strongly supported nuclear energy by, among other actions, adding to federal loan guarantees in support of the Vogtle Units three and four project and making multiple large cost-share awards to a range of reactor design companies. Those actions helped the first AP1000s to reach commercial operations and accelerated the development of other reactor designs, including the Kairos Hermes project, which started construction in 2024. The Trump administration also negotiated an agreement with Poland to build American reactors there, which has continued to make progress.
Despite profound differences on energy and climate with its predecessor, the Biden administration took care not to dismantle Trump’s nuclear energy policies, instead preserving and building upon elements that aligned with its agenda. The Biden administration exerted diplomatic heft in support of nuclear energy and signed bills passed by Congress that provided new tax incentives for both existing and new reactors. John Kerry, the U.S. climate envoy under Biden, touted the prospective export of U.S. small modular reactors (SMRs) to Romania at COP26 in Glasgow and championed the goal to triple nuclear power globally at COP28 in Dubai. Also, during the Biden administration, U.S. export financing institutions issued letters of intent to support the Polish reactor build program.
In 2025, President Trump can keep the bipartisan streak on nuclear energy alive and well within the framework of his “energy dominance strategy.” His vision on energy policy hinges on increasing overall production, decreasing import dependence, and boosting exports. To be sure, President Trump may intend for U.S. oil and gas production to be this agenda’s primary beneficiary, but nuclear can and should play a critical role in supporting U.S. energy independence and export potential.
In particular, the Trump administration could grow nuclear energy’s place in the market by leaning into President Trump’s policy instincts: lowering regulatory barriers, growing American manufacturing at home, and competing with Chinese technology abroad.
First, the Trump White House could work with Congress to legislate permitting reforms. The lengthy regulatory approval process has emerged as a significant obstacle to building new energy infrastructure, impeding nuclear reactors, oil and gas pipelines, and the transmission lines needed to connect wind and solar to the grid. The Trump administration, as its signature energy policy, could work with Congress to advance a bipartisan deregulatory energy agenda that facilitates the energy buildout. As part of that effort, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, under its new Chairman, David Wright, could reform the licensing process for new reactors and, in particular, streamline its environmental reviews, which have, in some cases, taken many years to complete. Trump could further jumpstart “national interest” zones for new nuclear projects and associated AI data centers. Such zones could have expedited permitting and other favorable terms.
Second, President Trump could preserve and leverage the Loan Programs Office (LPO) at the Department of Energy (DOE) to accelerate nuclear deployment. President Trump mostly shuttered LPO in his first term, but it could be wielded to advance nuclear priorities. The office received $250 billion in expanded loan authority under the IRA and has roughly $200 billion in remaining authority to finance innovative, clean energy technologies. The second Trump administration’s Energy Department could leverage the existing loan authority to offer loans and catalytic financial products to new, innovative nuclear designs.
Further, he could retain and expand funding for nuclear reactor deployment elsewhere within the Energy Department. DOE has received billions in new, bipartisan funding to help build and deploy new nuclear—however, some of that funding is housed within new offices such as the Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations created during the Biden administration. The Trump administration may well intend to undo changes to the department’s organizational chart but should not toss the funding along with it. The Biden administration notably did not reverse the awards to nuclear reactor companies made in President Trump’s fourth year in office, including those to TerraPower, X-energy, and Kairos. Instead, Biden officials negotiated and implemented those awards.
Third, the incoming Trump administration can expand the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and direct it to make a certain number of nuclear investments within a defined time period. Congress, in creating the DFC during Trump’s first term, specifically gave it the authority to invest in and finance nuclear projects abroad, but the agency has generally been hesitant to do so despite an increased emphasis on clean energy under Biden. DFC authorization expires in October 2025. Congress, in reauthorizing the DFC, can explicitly call upon the agency to dedicate time, resources, and staffing to nuclear.
Related to this, Trump can work with Congress to raise the default rate cap for the Export-Import Bank (EXIM). EXIM has traditionally played an important role in supporting U.S. nuclear exports but could do more with tweaks to its rules. It is subject to a statutory 2 percent default rate cap, which requires the bank to freeze lending if exceeded. That rate is uniquely restrictive among export credit agencies, and U.S. exporters have identified the cap as an impediment to their competitiveness. Beyond raising the cap, Congress could also seek other solutions to this issue in EXIM’s upcoming reauthorization, including exempting specific categories of transactions from counting towards the cap and/or granting the EXIM Board of Directors discretion to exclude certain financing from default rate calculations.
To this end, both EXIM and the DFC could accept or consider technology evaluations from other offices and agencies like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, and LPO. Loan officers within these agencies face the difficult task of evaluating technology risk across myriad sectors. Their colleagues elsewhere in the U.S. government, like the NRC and DOE, have the relevant expertise and are already evaluating new reactor designs that could lower deployment costs. Relying on interagency coordination can increase administrative efficiency and cut red tape.
President Trump’s National Energy Council—to be led by Interior Secretary Doug Burgum—could explore options to leverage EXIM and DFC to help finance the scale-up of U.S. advanced nuclear in partnerships with allied export credit agencies and development finance institutions. The list of countries keenly interested in adopting U.S. SMRs and advanced reactor technologies is growing. To meet that demand and head off Chinese and Russian competition, the United States can enter into co-financing partnerships with close allies like the UK to build order books of specific reactor designs of mutual interest and advance them toward cost maturity.
Taking the path outlined above would not require any significant departure on President Trump’s part. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has touted nuclear power as a low-emission, weather-independent power source with small land impacts and huge scaling ability that can provide both electricity and high-temperature process heat.
Democrats, for their part, should hope that Trump, Wright, and Burgum succeed if they pick up where the Biden administration left off on nuclear energy.
First, the most credible analyses depicting how the world can meet higher energy consumption as part of lifting millions of people out of energy poverty while at the same time reducing air pollution and greenhouse emissions are those with substantial growth in nuclear reactor builds.
Second, the United States will need more nuclear, which can provide large amounts of firm, clean power to retain its AI advantage. Ceding that advantage because the United States cannot build new power fast enough would be a national security misstep. Tech firms have tapped shuttered nuclear capacity to build data centers, but there are scant opportunities outside Japan and Germany. New builds are necessary for the United States to maintain an AI lead.
Last, as one of its last energy announcements, the Biden administration set the goal of deploying 200 gigawatts of new nuclear capacity by 2050. This long-term goal will require the Trump administration, the current Republican Congress, and several more administrations over the next two decades to shepherd. While President Trump is certainly not bound to his predecessor’s goal, the spirit of it certainly aligns with his goal of “energy dominance.”
Nuclear power requires decades-long support spanning multiple administrations, where the political pendulum tends to swing back and forth between the two major parties on a four- or eight-year cycle. These days, bipartisanship is rare, but nuclear energy remains a notable exception. It is a chance for President Trump to build on the current momentum, prioritize the necessary resources, and see through the completion of projects initiated during his first term, as well as support new projects. He has the opportunity in his second term to advance nuclear energy’s development so that it serves millions, if not billions, of people in the decades to come.
Sagatom Saha is an adjunct research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University, where he helps lead climate and trade initiatives. He previously served in the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy John Kerry and at the International Trade Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Matt Bowen is a senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University and previously served as an associate deputy assistant secretary in the Office of Nuclear Energy at the Energy Department.
Alan Ahn is deputy director for nuclear for Third Way’s Climate and Energy Program.
Image: Harry Kazianis / Shutterstock.com.