Nuclear Energy Policy in the Second Trump Administration
As the Trump administration makes key nuclear energy policy appointments, tariffs threaten to undermine U.S. competitiveness in next-generation reactors.
In the early days of the second Trump administration, two schools of thought appeared to be emerging regarding the approach to policy and governance, and the tension between these two schools could determine U.S. nuclear energy policy for the next four years. On the one hand, the Trump administration has selected people to work on nuclear energy policy who are steeped in these issues and who have had impressive careers in the policy realm. These choices bode well for an industry that is primed to license, build, and export next-generation technologies. However, many of the administration’s overarching policies that are seemingly unrelated to nuclear energy—perhaps most importantly tariffs—could have a chilling effect on the industry’s progress.
The Trump administration’s picks for key roles for nuclear energy policy, especially at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), demonstrate a commitment to nuclear energy and a recognition of the role of nuclear energy in U.S. and global energy security. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has voiced strong support for nuclear energy, highlighting its potential to supply reliable power for AI and other tech company requirements.
President Donald Trump’s other DOE picks have established records on nuclear energy policy: Preston Wells Griffith III has been named for the role of undersecretary of energy, the Honorable Brandon Williams has been named as administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Honorable Theodore Garrish has been named as assistant secretary for nuclear energy. At the NRC, President Trump has nominated the Honorable David A. Wright to serve as chairman, another indication that the administration supports licensing and deployment for next-generation nuclear energy technologies.
At the same time as the Trump administration appears to be putting people in place to move forward on nuclear energy-specific policies, a number of broader administration policies may serve to undercut the implied goals of licensing and deployment. Uncertainty around continued federal funds for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program and provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act are creating a challenging policy landscape for next-generation nuclear technologies.
Matthew Wald’s recent article for The Breakthrough Institute outlines the potential impact of tariffs on nuclear energy cooperation between the United States and Canada, which extends to fuel enrichment and reactor exports. Wald’s arguments are correct and go far beyond Canada. Tariffs, especially on steel and aluminum, will likely increase the costs of building new reactors (of whatever type) in the United States, and would also make it far more challenging for the United States to export new nuclear energy technologies.
A Council on Foreign Relations article notes that, although tariffs might benefit U.S. steel producers, “any job gains will likely be offset by losses in manufacturing and other industries that rely on steel… Research estimates that Trump’s 2018 tariffs led to the direct loss of seventy-five thousand manufacturing jobs, with additional losses from retaliatory tariffs imposed by other countries, often on non-steel products.” Tariffs on imported goods will make it more expensive to build reactors, which will be especially challenging for companies that hope to build fleets of reactors in the United States over the next several years.
Finally, uncertainty in international trade and the possibility of retaliatory tariffs could pose challenges to U.S. civil nuclear exports. In the last several decades, Russia has become the largest global exporter of nuclear energy technologies, with China following as a distant second but working to take the lead. In order to uphold the highest standards of safety, security, and nonproliferation, it is imperative that the United States and its allies gain primacy in the global nuclear energy market. However, many emerging market countries are in the global South and may struggle to afford the high upfront costs of nuclear reactors, a situation that might only be exacerbated by potential trade wars and increasing prices.
Ultimately, the Trump administration will need to reconcile its stated goal of unleashing U.S. energy dominance and its efforts to put together a world-class nuclear energy policy team with its broader trade goals.
Jennifer T. Gordon is director of the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center’s Nuclear Energy Policy Initiative. Jennifer was previously a senior energy analyst at the National Journal’s Network Science Initiative.
Image: Wikimedia Commons / United States Department of Energy