President Trump’s Masterclass: Blundering A Ukraine Peace Deal
The new Trump administration hit the ground running formulating a plan to resolve the war between Russia and Ukraine. The only problem? America’s priorities with Ukraine, Russia, and the European community are all askew.
Over the past week, the Trump administration has begun outlining its approach to brokering an end to the Russia-Ukraine war. These ideas have raised consternation in Kyiv and among U.S. allies in Europe, however, Moscow seemed elated. Administration officials have made basic negotiating errors when rolling out their approach that, left uncorrected, will doom their bid to end the war.
First, No Premature Concessions
A settlement of the war, and the prospects for its durability, will be judged on two factors: how much Ukrainian territory remains in Russian hands, and what security guarantees Kyiv receives. On February 12, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth called it unrealistic for Ukraine to regain all its territory or to join NATO. If Washington seeks to play an honest broker, senior American officials should not concede points to the Kremlin at the outset.
Second, Be In On The Landing and Takeoff
Europe has a direct interest in the outcome of the war, and the administration envisages Europe playing a major role in implementing a settlement by providing peacekeeping or security forces, with no U.S. force contribution. Washington reportedly has asked European officials to draft plans for those forces. Yet, administration officials say Europe will not take part in negotiating a settlement in which they could end up putting their troops at risk.
Meanwhile, President Donald Trump announced major policy changes affecting U.S. allies with no apparent advance consultations with them. He echoed Hegseth’s comment that Ukraine could not join NATO, even though U.S. and NATO policy has said Ukraine was on an “irreversible path” to membership.
He announced upcoming meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin when recent Western policy has eschewed such meetings. He said he wanted Russia back in the G8 after the G7 expelled Russia following its seizure of Crimea in 2014.
Such dismissive treatment of allies on issues directly affecting their security will hardly increase prospects that they will assist U.S. efforts. On February 14, Vice President JD Vance appeared at Europe’s premier security conference with the opportunity to repair some of the damage but ignored the issue of the day: Russia’s war against Ukraine and the security threat it poses to the trans-Atlantic community.
In response to all this, French President Emmanuel Macron convened an emergency meeting of European leaders on February 17 to discuss how to address the U.S.’s new hands-off approach to NATO allies.
Third, Correct The Sequencing
Trump’s first call on ending the war went to Putin. It should have gone to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
Ukraine has been a U.S. partner for thirty years, while Putin has made Russia an adversary of America. Ukraine is the aggrieved party, the victim of Russian neo-imperialist aggression. Trump should have talked to Zelensky first to understand where Kyiv has flexibility and where it does not.
Trump’s second set of calls should have gone to senior European leaders, whom he wants to provide military force to back up any deal that he brokers. It would have been smarter not to surprise them with a string of abrupt U.S. policy changes.
Trump should have waited to call Putin until after completing these conversations. His inexplicable eagerness to engage weakens his hand with his Russian counterpart.
Fourth, Build Negotiating Leverage
Trump also should have gathered leverage with Putin before calling the Russian leader, who shows readiness to discuss only his terms for Ukraine’s capitulation.
Seeing as Ukraine’s need for American support gives Washington plenty of leverage with Kyiv. Trump has ample ways to build that leverage: ask Congress to approve new military assistance for Ukraine, work with the G7 to transfer frozen Central Russian Bank assets to a fund for Ukraine, and tighten sanctions on Russia.
Thus far, he has taken none of these steps.
The Trump administration’s shambolic efforts took a turn for the worse over the weekend, and Washington announced that Secretary of State Marco Rubio would meet Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to discuss, among other things, the Russia-Ukraine war without Ukraine at the table.
Putin would like nothing more than to engage Trump in a bilateral negotiation to settle the war and on Europe’s broader security architecture, ideally, one-on-one, in which he could cajole and manipulate Trump.
If his mediating effort is to work, Trump would do well to remember that Zelensky must agree to the terms. On February 16, Zelensky said he would “never accept” a settlement reached by just the United States and Russia. Ukrainians are ready to continue fighting rather than consent to a fait accompli negotiated over their heads.
The administration’s opening miscues make it unlikely that it can broker a just and durable end to the war. Trump needs an immediate change of course if he hopes to succeed.
About The Author
Steven Pifer is affiliated with Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and the Brookings Institution, and is a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.
Image: Shutterstock.