Russia Can’t Win A War Of Maneuver In Ukraine—But It Doesn’t Have To
Even though the Russian forces lack the necessary sophistication to be considered a true near-peer adversary for the U.S. military and NATO, their “antiquated” attritional strategy gets the work done.
In a recent intelligence assessment, the British Ministry of Defence referred to the Russian military’s practice of repeated “dismounted infantry attacks.” These attacks often resemble the tactics used in the First World War—namely, mass infantry assaults against fortified defensive lines.
This fixation on dismounted infantry attacks highlights another problem plaguing the Russian military: an inability to properly conduct combined arms operations in the ongoing war.
The Russian Army’s Lack of Sophistication
Combined arms warfare is the fusion of different types of capabilities and forces to achieve superiority over an adversary. The most effective combined arms operations bring together different combat elements—such as artillery, air power, infantry, and armored forces—to complement one another and enhance their combined effect on the battlefield. Under normal circumstances, an infantry charge against a fortified position will likely fail. But such an attack is more likely to succeed if it is accompanied by tactical air support and accurate artillery fire.
Combined arms warfare really shines when a military force has room to maneuver. The German Wehrmacht was the first to show what this type of warfare could do in the modern era when it blitzed its way through France and the Low Countries in May 1940.
By contrast, the Russian military has shown ineptness in conducting combined arms warfare. Even when it had the opportunity to maneuver in the early days of the war, the Russian forces did not achieve any of their primary objectives—due in part to poor coordination between different parts of the armed services. The Kremlin only managed to capture Kherson, which the Ukrainians liberated a few months later after a series of textbook maneuver warfare offensives.
Of course, even though the Russian forces lack the necessary sophistication to be considered a true near-peer adversary for the U.S. military and NATO, their “antiquated” attritional strategy gets the work done.
Russia’s Attrition Strategy is Bleeding Ukraine Out
Currently, the Russian military is pursuing an attritional strategy that relies heavily on high casualties. On the face of it, such a strategy sounds nonsensical—what commander would support a strategy that hinges on losing a lot of men? But higher casualties for one side often mean higher casualties for the other, too. In this, Moscow has a clear logic: its population is more than three times larger than Ukraine’s.
The Kremlin’s goal in the conflict, short of outright victory, is to capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible in order to strengthen the Russian position in current and future peace talks. However, Russian commanders understand that they do not have the capabilities—air superiority, artillery advantage, or more mechanized forces—to fight a maneuver warfare campaign that could result in an operational breakthrough. With this realization as a fact, Russian commanders have taken the next logical step to achieve Moscow’s goals. Since they have the manpower resources to tolerate high casualty rates, Russian commanders are exchanging men for territory.
And this approach has been working. Over the past several months, the Russian forces have captured thousands of square kilometers of territory, even though at a slow pace.
Now, the question is whether the Russian forces can sustain such a high level of attrition. In 2024 alone, the Russian military, paramilitary units, and pro-Russian separatist forces lost over 400,000 men killed and wounded, according to Western sources. The Russian forces might be gaining ground, but if Moscow can no longer sustain its strategy, their offensive would grind to a halt—and might even allow the Ukrainians to strike back.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
Image: Shutterstock / Corona Borealis Studio.