Trump and Erdogan Have The Chance To Reset U.S.-Turkey Relations
Washington will need Ankara if it wishes to wind down conflicts in Syria and Ukraine.
After Donald Trump declared victory on November 5, 2024, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was one of the first world leaders to congratulate the future president of the United States publicly. The two spoke on the phone about how to improve cooperation between the United States and Turkey, and Erdoğan expressed hope in a post on X that “Turkey-U.S. relations will strengthen.” With President Trump now back in the White House, his administration should invest in its pivotal relationship with Turkey by prioritizing an in-person visit between Trump and Erdoğan to discuss Turkey’s role in Syria and Ukraine.
Presidents Trump and Erdoğan maintained a strong personal relationship during the first Trump administration despite rocky bilateral relations. The “bromance” between the two leaders seemed, at times, to be the primary reason why an otherwise strained partnership between the United States and Turkey did not completely collapse. If President Trump intends to follow through on his campaign promises—including ending the war in Ukraine—Turkey will be a key piece in the puzzle to achieve lasting peace. For this reason, as well as Turkey’s general military and geographical advantages, Trump and his team should prioritize and invest in U.S.-Turkey relations in the first few months of the new administration.
Despite Trump and Erdoğan’s close personal ties, broader U.S.-Turkey relations under the first Trump administration—and well into Biden’s presidency—were strained. In 2019, Turkey purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system, incurring sanctions and public recriminations from the United States. Ankara’s opposition to Finland’s and Sweden’s bids to join NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also incited ire and frustration from its American partner. Moreover, Turkey’s steady slide away from democracy increasingly strained the relationship.
However, within the last year, the stage has been set to establish a more stable U.S.-Turkey relationship. The Turkish government’s ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership in early 2024 led to the Biden administration approving the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, taking the heat out of the NATO membership and S-400 disputes. Following local Turkish elections in May 2024, Erdoğan is striking a more conciliatory tone. Turkey’s democracy is down but not out of the running. Additionally, the U.S.-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, accused of orchestrating an attempted coup against Erdoğan in 2016, died in October—eradicating a sore point between Turkey and the United States, which had consistently refused to grant Ankara’s requests to extradite the cleric.
Why Turkey?
Turkey possesses several unique advantages that are beneficial for the United States, most notably its military prowess and geographic location. Turkey’s unique geography and control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits give NATO—and, by extension, the United States—advantages in the case of a conflict with Russia. During Moscow’s war with Ukraine, Turkey enforced the Montreux Convention to close off the straits to warships from any country, impeding Russia’s war efforts. Without Ankara’s willingness to enforce the Convention, NATO would find it much more difficult to deter and respond to Russian aggression in the region. Turkey’s shared border with Syria also means that it has long been invested in the conflict there—including by taking in millions of Syrian refugees. As Syria rebuilds after the fall of President Bashar al-Assad, Ankara will play an outsized role in shaping the renewal of a country essential for regional stability and security.
Ankara also possesses the second-largest standing army (after the United States) in NATO, including 402,000 active-duty soldiers, with another 260,000 in the reserves. It is well-trained, sophisticated, and capable of joint operations. Turkey actively contributes to NATO operations and missions and was a significant contributor to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. The State Department’s Integrated Country Strategy for Turkey states that its sizable military, combined with its geographic location at the southeastern flank of the alliance, gives it a “critical role” in regional security.
Turkey’s indigenous military capacity also would be advantageous in an active conflict. Ankara has reduced its dependence on foreign technology in the defense industry from 70 percent to 30 percent over the past eighteen years and will spend more than 2 percent of its GDP on defense in 2024. Ankara has also become an influential player in the international drone market, even cutting into China’s global market share—a bonus for the United States.
Admittedly, Turkey will remain a tricky ally. Its geography means it must balance competing interests and security risks by maintaining links with its challenging neighbors. Turkey does so most often through economic links—especially with Russia and Iran—while prioritizing close political ties with the United States and Europe. However, Turkey’s balancing act also provides a benefit. Its economic ties with Russia—most recently through its application to the BRICS group—provide some deterrence to Russian aggression. By maintaining links with both sides, Turkey is especially well positioned to support potential peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in the future—a priority for President Trump.
Ankara’s sympathy for Hamas is another roadblock. Rumors in mid-November 2024 that Turkey was prepared to offer a base for Hamas’s leaders after their expulsion from Qatar were met with swift condemnation by the Biden administration, and given Trump’s pro-Israel stance, further overtures to the group are likely to be problematic for the new administration.
To prioritize and invest in U.S.-Turkey relations in the first few months of the new administration, President Trump and his team should:
1) Increase dialogue and identify areas of aligned interest.
Both parties’ priority in the first few months should be to increase dialogue, identifying areas where interests align and where there is room for greater cooperation. Erdoğan already has extended an invitation to President Trump to visit Turkey. Taking Erdoğan up on this offer would allow Trump and his team to quickly define the parameters of a new relationship.
Most importantly, the Trump administration will need Turkey as a partner if it wants to follow through on campaign promises to reduce the U.S. presence on the international stage. Trump has already recognized that “Turkey is going to hold the key to Syria.” Washington should prioritize working with Turkish officials to support lasting peace and stability in Syria and prevent a resurgence of ISIS. Erdoğan also has expressed interest in playing a role in mediating the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Turkey’s ties with both sides of the conflict could facilitate its role as a mediator and de-escalate tensions that currently drain U.S. resources and attention.
2) Compromise.
Rebuilding the relationship will require mutual compromises. Turkey’s first step should be to relinquish the Russian S-400 air defense system. Doing so would help restore trust between the United States and Turkey and improve NATO’s overall military cohesion. There are encouraging signs that Turkey is considering putting the system into storage. Trump should use his relationship with Erdoğan to push for a complete surrender of the systems in return for re-entry into the U.S. F-35 program. Ankara also should refrain from any further outreach to Hamas if Turkey wants to position itself as a credible peacemaker in the region.
Turkey’s role as a middle power becomes more valuable in a shifting world order. In the face of an increasingly revisionist Russia and an unstable geopolitical landscape, Washington should take this time to build a better working relationship with Ankara so that it can rely on its ally and work together more effectively in the future.
Kate Johnston is an associate fellow in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
Gibbs McKinley is the research associate to the CEO at CNAS.
Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com.