Ukraine Wants a Ceasefire—But How?
Ukraine’s attempts to secure a ceasefire on favorable terms have been undermined by a string of battlefield losses—and a lack of Western support.
Negotiations over a ceasefire continue among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States. If the U.S.’ proposal for a 30-day ceasefire goes forward, the door for peace will be wide open. But even if there is peace, Ukraine and its Western partners will need to ensure that it will last.
Ukraine Is Arming Up to Achieve Lasting Peace
The Ukrainian military has paid a heavy cost in the defense of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Today, the Ukrainian forces seem to lack the necessary offensive capability to reclaim the strategic initiative and launch an offensive operation that would achieve an operational breakthrough. Without this capability and additional security assistance, it will be very hard indeed to alter the situation on the ground.
A ceasefire would benefit the Ukrainian forces. But the where to draw the lines would have a significant effect on potential future fighting.
“The US and Europe would likely need to provide military aid to Ukraine more rapidly, in much larger volumes, and at higher cost the closer the ultimate ceasefire lines are to the current frontline,” the Institute for the Study of War estimated in its latest assessment on the Ukrainian conflict.
But if the Ukrainian forces were behind more defensive positions, a ceasefire would be more valuable. “A ceasefire along more defensible positions would also place Russian forces in a more disadvantaged position for renewed offensive operations, making future Russian aggression less likely,” ISW added.
If the war were to end today, the Ukrainian military would have to undergo a significant growth and rearming process to provide a credible deterrent against future Russian aggression. Although there is a risk of future Ukrainian offensive action to reclaim territory lost under a potential peace settlement, it is likely that such action would not enjoy Western support.
Ukraine’s 2023 Counteroffensive Was a Turning Point
If there was a turning point in the war, that was probably the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer of 2023.
The Ukrainian military spent months preparing a large-scale offensive operation in the southeastern part of the contact line. Units that would spearhead the operation received the latest heavy weapon systems from the West, including Challenger 2 and Leopard 2 main battle tanks and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. However, the United States and NATO were characteristically slow in providing important capabilities to the Ukrainian forces in time. For example, the decision to provide Ukraine with main battle tanks was taken in January, leaving little time for different countries to provide sufficient numbers of different tanks to Ukraine and for Ukrainian tankers to receive the necessary training.
It would be difficult to attribute the failure of the offensive to any one cause. But when the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched their offensive, they fell on Russia’s defensive works—the largest and most comprehensive defensive line seen in Europe since the end of World War II. Understanding its own shortcomings, the Russian military leadership focused on the defense, erecting miles of defensive works and peppering with anti-tank and anti-personnel mines hundreds of square kilometers of territory.
The Ukrainians simply lacked the necessary offensive punch to break through these defenses and storm toward the Crimean Peninsula. Had they received capabilities, such as more main battle tanks, long-range missiles, and fighter jets—capabilities that they ended up receiving in the end—the Ukrainian forces might have succeeded in breaking the Russian defenses, and the situation on the battlefield would be far more favorable now.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
Image: Shutterstock / Volodymyr Kutsenko.