A U.S. Ambassador Reflects on Afghanistan
If one year ago I returned from a trip to Afghanistan more hopeful than previously, my return this time highlighted the immensity of the challenges, the dangers to our nation of retreat, and yet a few bright spots difficult to properly assess. Elections, security and peace negotiations are the themes that dominate Kabul discussions. Each is messy, with head snapping contradictions that make most simple bottom line assessments at least partially wrong.
For background on what follows: My last yearly trip was July 2017. This November I spent a week in Kabul. The impressions that follow do not represent scientific sampling but, rather, nearly forty meetings with Afghan government officials, opposition figures, businessmen, women and men active in civil society, foreign diplomats and observers as well as American civilian and military officials. Many of these are people I have known for over a decade. What follows, then, is an impressionistic synthesis of what I heard.
Elections
The parliamentary elections are past but complicated vote tallying methods mean that it will be weeks before the results will be known. Before the election the hope of most Afghans I knew was simply that they would be better than in the past. In some ways the elections were better and in others not. This was the first election that Afghan forces had to secure without foreign troop support. There was a good deal of violence, some locations were deemed too violent to try to have voting. Some polling places did not open because of threats. The Taliban made a significant effort to stop the voting through threats, bombs and mortar fire at polling stations. Yet the election went forward.
The total incidents of violence seem to have been roughly similar to the last election when over 100,000 foreign troops were helping with security. And the Afghan people voted. The turnout was in the neighborhood of 40 percent. All figures in Afghanistan are subject to dispute but if the number of votes is inflated one must also consider that many who turned out to vote went home without casting ballots due to the mismanagement of polling places. In short, the turnout was about the same as the last parliamentary election eight years ago. What is noteworthy is that this was far larger than expected. Afghan journalists, a cynical crowd, were uniform in telling me that the turnout was far larger than they expected. Several people also felt there was less fraud than previously although this impression may change as the votes are counted.
If the Afghan security services performed credibly with significant casualties to demonstrate their efforts and the people performed well and bravely, the Afghan government largely failed them. Despite four years to prepare and promises from President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, the administration of the elections was a disaster. The administration of the Independent Election Commission was a shamble. Voting lists were missing or delivered late with citizens scrambling to find the correct polling place. No one was immune from the chaos. In Kabul, the one place where decent organization should have been possible, even CEO Dr. Abdullah had to wait half an hour for election officials to find his name on the voting list. A former governor of Kabul told me of having to go to four different locations to find his name on the voting rolls.
Despite months of controversy and discussion, the decision to deploy biometric voting devices was made late, training on them was massively inadequate, many ran out of power and some locations never received the devices. The Independent Election Commission (IEC) performed poorly, but the government, the political opposition (which demanded technical changes when they could not be properly implemented) and even the international community (which was slow to help with the biometric decision) all share in responsibility. This has now left the government and politicians grappling with a perplexing problem. If those ballots taken with the biometric devices are counted the results will be more honest, but many genuine voters will be disenfranchised. If ballots taken without the machines are counted, the right of citizens to vote will be better respected but the opportunities for fraud will greatly expand as will disputes over the results.
The two principles espoused by democracy advocates—the right of people to have their vote counted and the importance of a transparent result—are now in conflict. Yet even in this chaos there are some, small positive notes; several younger candidates, despite knowing that they may well be disadvantaged, told one UN official that only the biometrically taken ballots should be counted. The others should be “martyred” for the sake of a clean election. It is an anecdote that, along with the turnout, exemplifies how much Afghans as a people have accepted elections and want them to be clear even if many of the old, corrupt practices still predominate at more senior levels.
Even as everyone waits for the results of the parliamentary elections, all attention is swinging to the presidential election. President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai is badly weakened. Governance in the countryside is generally esteemed to be poor. His government appears to be melting down as senior figures abandon ship; his finance minister resigned, his former national security advisor and deputy foreign minister are both opposition candidates. There is no ambassador in Washington because Ghani’s capable ambassador had to be moved to Kabul to take over the national security portfolio.
The most repeated comment I heard from a variety of opposition leaders was that the one thing they all agreed on was that President Ghani should not have a second term. Ethnic divisions have seriously deepened during Ghani’s tenure with many seeing him as an eastern Pashtun nationalist who is freezing out other ethnic groups. This perception may be exaggerated, as Ghani and his supporters maintain, but it exists. One young Hazara, a group long on the bottom of the social pecking order and many of whom voted for Ghani, told me he felt betrayed. He had seen Ghani’s call to bring in more Afghan youth as a step into the future and now believes it was a trick simply to clear the way for the appointment to Pashtun youth. Other young supporters of the president dispute this.
Despite all this, it would be a mistake to count Ghani out. We have no real idea of his national popularity among people, rather than leaders. Our perceptions are far too dependent on contacts in Kabul since fears of risk (largely driven from Washington) have bottled up Embassy personnel even where they could circulate with deployed U.S. military. One former Ghani supporter who has turned against him noted how his guards and their families in the provinces all support Ghani because they think he is trying to help them. Many of those who may run against Ghani have dubious reputations. None of the electoral blocks that are trying to form are yet solid. Actual candidates and their tickets will only be known in December when candidates register formally for the election. Many of those who now appear to be running will settle for positions on someone else’s ticket if they can get it. Former national security advisor Hanif Atmar is widely reckoned as a leading contender, but there is enormous jockeying for position among various leaders. The promises of today are weak guarantees for the performance of tomorrow.
There is great discussion of forming a broad coalition of political and ethnic groups to oppose Ghani. If this really comes about and holds together it could defeat him, at least in an honest election. But such ideas have failed many times in the past and the coalition has not yet happened. The apparent decision of the largely Tajik party Jamiat to run a candidate may further diminish the chances to form a big party consensus and will make the election more ethnically divisive. If there are multiple candidates, then none are likely to exceed the 50 percent required for victory and there will be a second round. There would be a lot of bargaining in that case and many opportunities for Ghani to pick up support from disaffected “also rans.” The scenarios discussed by Afghan leaders multiply geometrically. In short, no one should count Ghani out and other governments would be well advised not to treat him prematurely as a lame duck.
An election that ends like that of 2014—in massive fraud and dispute—is a broadly shared fear. Afghan politicians have gotten used to America saving their country from disaster, even if they later criticize the solution. The danger is that they will think that they retain the freedom to push their own positions to the limits and then find that there is no American appetite for saving them. Worse, if President Donald Trump wants to exit Afghanistan and is mainly restrained by the desire to avoid being responsible for a disaster, then a prolonged crisis after the election could provide the political top cover for Trump to leave on the basis that Afghans simply cannot be saved.
There are limits to what America and the international community can do. Some want to take the high ground: focus on insisting on outcomes like verifiable and transparent vote counts. But these sorts of principles are meaningless if they cannot be attached to practical and detailed measures to implement them. Ultimately, the international community cannot save Afghanistan if Afghan chicanery is too large. But that is not certain to happen. There are powerful forces that want a clean, or at least a cleaner, election. The political opposition has shown an impressive ability to learn how to work together to bring pressure on the Afghan government for election reform. An article written from a distance would err in trying to provide tactics. What can be pointed out is that America and its allies must work closely with the UN, which has the lead for the international community in the elections, on pressing for practical improvements in processes for the presidential elections. Too much is at stake for our own policy and interests to be excessively deferential to Afghan sovereignty if it is used as a cover for fraud.
Peace Negotiations
Intertwining with electoral considerations are discussions of the new, intensified American effort to find a negotiated peace and how that will affect or even replace elections. Rumors of what America wants or is doing flicker constantly across political discussions. One idea that is discussed is whether elections should be suspended in favor of some sort of transitional government that would include the Taliban. The argument is that once elections take place things will be more rigid politically so now is the time to move on peace negotiations.
U.S. special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad is in constant motion around the region and in and out of Kabul. One rumor that edged its way into the New York Times contended that Khalilzad was already proposing the suspension of elections in order to form a transitional government. That story is probably false. From what I heard of Khalilzad’s talk with various political figures, his approach is squarely centered on getting a broad based and representative Afghan delegation organized to participate in talks with the Taliban. His message to the Taliban is similar: put forth a representative delegation and engage. Whether or not it succeeds, it is a sensible place to start that recognizes that only Afghans can decide how they will live together. Yet there are many reasons why some on each side, Taliban and Afghan government alike, fear moving quickly and are dragging their feet.
The atmosphere is complicated by the discussion of whether the elections should be suspended in favor of a transitional government and whether such a government should emerge from an agreement or precede it. The theory has a certain elegance. Many fear that the elections will be a disaster leading to political dispute and immobilism. So, goes the argument, let us get around this danger by agreeing to a transitional government that can control things while negotiations take place. In other words, redo the Bonn negotiations which charted the 2001 political roadmap of Afghanistan, but this time include the Taliban.
The problem is that the theory comes apart when one examines its execution. The Bonn agreement was difficult to arrive at. As one senior figure who was at Bonn pointed out to me, at those negotiations there were a small number of parties, no war, a climate of peace and Iran, Russia and Pakistan were generally helpful. There is now a much greater fragmentation of the Afghan political landscape, the Taliban may have fragmentation of their own, the fighting is intense, and Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors are partisan and malign. Getting agreement on an interim government that includes the Taliban would be extremely difficult. And while negotiations raged, perhaps for months, over who would have which ministry, the government would be immobilized and the fighting would rage on.
A variant of the plan would have the interim government result from the negotiations. If an agreement on the details of such a government—rather than merely agreement on the principle that it will be set up—was to come out of negotiations, that might be a reason to suspend the elections. Maybe that can happen, but elections are five months away. No conflict of similar complexity has been negotiated with such speed. What is clear is that to suspend the elections only to start negotiations would be a grave mistake. Essentially it would allow the Taliban to make a hostage of the institutional development of Afghanistan and keep it prisoner until they got their way. I doubt that Ambassador Khalilzad would fall into such a trap.
Underneath the clamor about how negotiations are to advance is a ripening Afghan desire for peace and some new consideration of some of the compromises it may require. I found that the popular call for peace seen in the long peace march of Afghans from Helmand to Kabul and the smaller demonstrations in the capital echoed in the discussions of major political leaders. No one has a precise plan, but there are lines of thought developing that I had not heard before. One opposition leader commented that the rights of women must be protected, but that this may require compromise rather than a victory of western concepts. Separate education of boys and girls might have to be accepted to preserve education for women. More use of the veil might be necessary to preserve women’s right to work. These are not points broadly accepted or even discussed, but when I noted them to a group of Afghan journalists many thought they might have to be considered.
Security
And then there is the elephant in the room, security. Much as one might like to just give up a project of this difficulty, the threats that brought us to Afghanistan are still present. Al Qaeda is reduced but still present. The Islamic State is now established with sufficient strength that neither the Taliban nor, separately, the combined Afghan and coalition efforts have been able to destroy it. The Islamic State in Khorasan, as the Islamic State calls itself in Afghanistan, is still more Afghan than foreign, but there is a slow trickle of recruits from elsewhere and its potential for expansion would be large if America departed.
No one denies that security is getting worse. There are various figures for how much territory the Taliban control. None are worth much and the variation in numbers represents more what analysts want to count than any differing precision. Nor does it matter. Perception creates its own facts. Every Afghan I met told me that security is declining. There are ever more areas where no one feels safe traveling, more districts where control is limited to an Afghan flag over a district center out of which local officials dare not drive. The war is not being lost in the sense that the Taliban are anywhere close to being able to take over the country. They took parts of the city of Ghazni, a major defeat for Afghan forces, but the Afghans did finally show improved ability to organize and fight back, retaking the city.
Like everything else in Afghanistan, the picture is mixed and those wanting to prove a point can pick the pieces they want to highlight. The commandos, the best performing part of the Afghan forces, are growing. If the government will stop misusing them on checkpoints and for regular infantry duty they probably can meet their expansion goals. They will not be numerous enough to win the war, but they will be a powerful strike force to keep Kabul from losing it. It is worth remembering that the Afghans are now doing most of the fighting and dying. They have not lost the war despite the withdrawal of over 100,000 foreign troops.
However, reforming the Ministry of the Interior has not worked; the police remain by all accounts a weak and corrupt force. They do not lack for courage, and are dying in far higher number than army soldiers. But there is no evidence that the inefficiency of political maneuvering and corruption is changing.
The regular army is better, but it is not meeting the expectations I had last year. American commanders and President Ghani have and are making a serious effort at reform. Some pieces are working. A large number of overage and often poorly performing generals have been retired. There are younger leaders who fight well. One senior U.S. officer told me that when Afghan brigade commanders pick officers for promotion, they generally pick the most competent. But overall the system of political alliances and corruption continue to impede the full professionalism of the force. They can fight well on planned operations but remain far too much a defensive force reliant on American air power, and they are incapable of taking the initiative from the Taliban. Parts of the enhanced training mission decided on by the Trump administration are working. We do not need a new policy. We do need a serious examination of how the execution of the strategy to achieve our policy goals may require adjustment.
Reform of Governance
There are still efforts at reform. Technical competence in several ministries is said to be improving. The Independent Administration Reform and Civil Service Commission is a continuing bright light. Against enormous counter pressures it continues to grind away at merit promotions and hiring. Jobs continue to be properly advertised, testing administered and the most qualified hired. The response is often staggering. Eighty thousand applicants applied for 800 positions in one case. The ranks of teachers are being pruned of so called “ghost teachers,” those for whom pay is drawn but no teacher exists. A complaints division within the Civil Service Commission is actually able to provide redress in some situations.
However, it is important to understand that this work is a matter of slowly and continuously taking small steps of reform against many strong elements of resistance. If it continues it will eventually make an extraordinarily important change in Afghanistan’s political culture. But this will take years. The effort could be set back or destroyed if the political deal making of the election deal out as spoils too many of the positions the Commission has painfully managed to fence off for merit promotion.
Some other important elements of reform are worth noting. The International Monetary Fund has reported “noticeable progress” in fiscal management and financial sector reform. The World Bank has praised Afghan governmental efforts to improve conditions for doing business in Afghanistan.
Other elements of reform, of which I was more hopeful last year, have slowed. The Anti-Corruption Justice Center has lost its luster. Prosecutions have not continued, President Ghani’s backing for aggressive investigation has come into question, and a recent report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan was quite scathing. Many other bureaucratic actions are touted as reform. Some of them may be so, such as the commission Ghani chairs on contracts, changes in tax collection, subnational governance or improvements in budgeting. Whatever the reality, the pace of reform has not made much of a public impression as far as one can judge from wide ranging conversations.
Summing up
There is no simple bottom line for Afghanistan. There is no short way out. The costs are large, but, at less than one percent of our defense budget, they are sustainable. The Afghans are still fighting and doing most of the dying. There are few American casualties. Reform is happening in some areas but overall it is more an aspiration than a reality. Any success will be very slow in coming. The shear length of the struggle will cause many to argue that it is time to quit. Against this must be set the fact that the threat of attack on the homeland from the al Qaeda that took us there still exists and has grown with the development to the Islamic State, which, after defeats in Iraq and Syria, has every reason to seek revenge against the United States. At least for now, when Ambassador Khalilzad’s efforts at starting negotiations are just beginning and while there is still a presidential election to get through and evaluate, it would be premature to give up on this agonizingly long struggle.
Ronald E. Neumann was US Ambassador to Afghanistan 2005-2007 and returns regularly.
Image: Afghan president Ashraf Ghani delivers a speech during the United Nations conference on Afghanistan on November 28, 2018 at the UN Office in Geneva, Switzerland. Fabrice COFFRINI/Pool via REUTERS.