What Do Drones Mean For Nuclear Deterrence?
Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability.
Drones and other autonomous vehicle technologies have already significantly influenced the conduct of war. The technology has evolved from simple reconnaissance tools to versatile platforms capable of conducting surveillance, targeted strikes, and electronic warfare. Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk have made them increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. The development of more advanced drones, capable of carrying out precision strikes with a high degree of autonomy, has prompted their consideration in strategic scenarios involving nuclear deterrence and warfare.
With their precision targeting ability, drones can also be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could also ensure the survival of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones can also support a more viable “second-strike” capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.
Deterrence and Escalation
The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a more severe attack, even when only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.
Both the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Able Archer episode in 1983 illustrate the risks of misperception leading to a higher risk of nuclear first use or first strike. The possibility that the expansion of the war in Ukraine from conventional weapons to nuclear first use could occur due to misinterpretations by Russia of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russian territory with NATO ballistic and cruise missiles, providing one example of concerns in this category. As Lewis A. Dunn, national security analyst and nonproliferation expert, has pointed out, newly re-elected President Donald Trump is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy.
Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising. China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control. The already-dire U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear matters has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats. Recent reports based on information from senior U.S. officials indicate that the United States could also update its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence against coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of the nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare.
Drones are relatively fast, low-cost, and hard to detect, which makes them ideal for preemptive strikes against high-value targets. In theory, a nation could deploy a drone strike against an adversary’s nuclear command and control infrastructure or missile silos, aiming to disrupt or neutralize a potential nuclear retaliation before it can be launched.
In addition, drones equipped with nuclear payloads or advanced conventional weapons could be used as part of a disarming strike. The ability to carry out such strikes could shift the strategic calculations of nations, as adversaries might feel more vulnerable to a preemptive attack, especially if they believe fast-moving drone strikes could neutralize their nuclear retaliation capabilities.
How Much Autonomy is Enough?
As drones become more autonomous, the risk of them making decisions without human oversight increases dramatically. In a nuclear context, where the consequences of any action are catastrophic, delegating decision-making to machines is dangerous. The potential for autonomous drones to trigger a nuclear response or make fatal miscalculations due to algorithmic errors presents a possible threat to strategic stability.
Since drones can operate autonomously to some degree, one challenge is ensuring that their actions do not trigger unintended escalation. Moreover, the reliance on technological systems for communication and control in a nuclear context raises concerns about vulnerabilities in these systems, especially if adversaries employ cyberattacks or electronic warfare tactics to disrupt drone operations.
AI, Drones, and Deterrence
Future generations of drones will interact with artificial intelligence (AI) that also supports other elements in the matrix of deterrence and defense. AI will privilege deterrence by denial, compared to deterrence by a credible threat of unacceptable retaliation. It will do so because states would have to manage in time the deterrence and conduct of conflicts in multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace; it is the domain of the mind to handle information and knowledge. The knowledge domain wraps around all the others. It is the “gnostic center” that controls connects, and prioritizes the component parts of the various domains to respond correctly to threats or attacks.
AI-assisted attacks on the gnostic center will require immediate responses by AI-assisted defenses that can defeat or diminish the cost of those attacks. Absorbing the first blow and then retaliating may not be a choice that is available to beleaguered and time-pressed decision-makers. This situation poses an especially concerning challenge for nuclear deterrence. Decisions for or against nuclear war should allow policy-makers sufficient time to deliberate alternatives with their advisors and to select the most appropriate option for the exigent circumstances. However, the potential speed of AI-boosted attacks against space and cyber assets, alongside the rising speed of kinetic strikes from hypersonic weapons, may leave leaders fearful of an enemy choosing preemption over retaliation.
Antimissile Defenses
Just as we can conceive of drones as reconnaissance and strike platforms for offenses, it is also possible that drones can be part of any state’s comprehensive antimissile and air defense plan. One illustration of this is the use of drone swarms to defeat attacking drones tasked with reconnaissance or reconnaissance-strike missions.
Another example would be the use of drones for electromagnetic “hit to kill” within the atmosphere or, even more ambitiously, in midcourse intercept against attacking ballistic missile forces. Drones based on one or more lunar spaceports could protect U.S. interests in cislunar space. Futuristic drones with embedded AI and space-to-space weapons could defend orbital satellites against attack (so-called DSATs) or engage another state’s satellites that appeared threatening (ASATs). Priority DSATs and ASATs would deter and defend against any threat to the viability of U.S. satellites for warning and assessment, command, control, communications, geolocation, and other missions.
Comparatively inexpensive drones could thus take over some of the strategic defense burdens, otherwise requiring both upgraded terrestrial missile launchers and kill vehicles or, eventually, sophisticated ballistic missile defenses based on space-to-earth weapons such as lasers or particle beams. Future planners should expect a more crowded space domain, including newer generations of orbital satellites with diverse missions, space stations, additional reconnaissance and strike weapons, along with smarter drones in larger swarms.
Nuclear Arms Control
The preceding discussion about drones and their possible relationships to nuclear deterrence has critical implications for nuclear arms control. For many reasons, it is imperative for a peace agreement to terminate the war in Ukraine. One reason is that the United States and Russia can resume negotiations about an arms control regime to succeed in the New START agreement, which will expire in 2026. The “beyond New START” consultations should include discussions about the two states’ arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and protocols for nuclear first use. Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine have been dismissed by some as bluffing for effect: a form of coercive diplomacy.
On the other hand, Russia’s doctrinal shifts as to the criteria for nuclear first use have appeared to move toward a more permissive standard as the war has continued. In addition to clarifying this matter, the United States and Russia must acknowledge that China is an aspiring nuclear peer and include China in discussions about nuclear policy issues, including transparency about force structures and military doctrines. While China is unlikely to be interested in arms reductions per se, dialogue should be initiated at the expert level to clarify China’s thinking about strategy, arms control, and related issues.
The Character of Conflict
The character of war always changes with the advent of new technologies and strategic thinking. Still, war is perennially an environment of competition and conflict, uncertainty, chance, and friction. The relationship between drones and strategic nuclear warfare represents a mixed blessing for military planners and arms control. Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability.
Drones can also enhance deterrence by strengthening second strike capability for assured retaliation and providing possible pathways to deterrence by denial as opposed to deterrence by a credible threat of punishment. As drone technology advances, it will be critical for policy-makers to develop strategies that account for the unique challenges drones pose in nuclear deterrence and, as well, their future roles in space and cyber wars.
Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues.
Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy Captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and universities and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration.
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