Rather than waiting—and hoping—that the Americans would protect them from their neighbors to the north, Seoul’s leaders could easily protect themselves.

According to a 2021 Chicago Council of Global Affairs (CCGA) poll, 71 percent of South Koreans who were polled support their government building nuclear weapons in the face of the growing challenge from North Korea. Eleven years earlier, in 2010, only 56 percent of South Koreans favored this possible move.

Though South Korea briefly considered a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s and early 1970s, they willingly chose to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons in 1975 following pressure from the United States.

South Korea’s Original Nuclear Program

In the 1970s, Seoul began worrying that it was being abandoned by its American allies after Washington announced it was removing some of its forces from the peninsula. But by 1975, under immense pressure from Washington, Seoul signed the UN’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and ceased all operations at their nuclear reprocessing facilities, where plutonium was being reprocessed for the purposes of making nuclear weapons. A 1958 treaty technically allows the United States to maintain nuclear weapons inside South Korea as a form of extended deterrence, but the Americans removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea by 1991. 

 

In 2025, Trump’s statements stressing an “America First” agenda—and past comments critical of U.S. defense spending in South Korea, as well as his strangely close relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un—have led many in Seoul to question whether the Americans will have their backs if Pyongyang does something crazy.

Since 2013, North Korea has possessed a growing, increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons capability. In the same year, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that North Korea had developed miniaturization capabilities. In other words, North Korea could place nuclear warheads atop increasingly advanced missiles. Meanwhile, the South Koreans have done little to counter this growing threat, instead relying upon the Americans to protect them from Pyongyang’s nuclear threat.

Seoul initially abandoned their pursuit of nuclear arms in the 1970s primarily because of fear about how the United States, their primary ally, would react. Today, South Korea fears that without nuclear weapons of their own, with the North Korean threat at its highest in years, they won’t be able to rely upon the Americans to protect them.

A New Threat to South Korea

Most observers assume that President Trump seeks to restart the peace talks with North Korea that occurred in Trump’s first term in office. In order for Trump to get these talks going, though, he’d have to distance America on some level from South Korea.

 

Therefore, to avoid being left out in the cold, Seoul will need to risk the ire of the United States and develop its own arsenal of nuclear weapons and sophisticated ballistic missiles. More interestingly, if South Korea did this, they might actually increase their chances of getting a real deal with North Korea. The evidence over the past 30 years suggests that Pyongyang cares little for diplomatic niceties, and only really responds to concrete threats against it. Under present conditions, there is little incentive for Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, to take anything the South says or does too seriously. With a credible South Korean nuclear deterrent, that might change.

Why Should America Sacrifice Its Sons and Daughters for South Korea?

The default move by the United States has been to shore up its alliance with South Korea by placing its personnel and its expensive equipment inside South Korea. These U.S. forces would form a “trip wire” of sorts. 

Under this concept, the North Koreans may be gung-ho to destroy the democratic regime of South Korea, but having some U.S. forces in the way, even if the North Koreans could overwhelm that smattering of U.S. forces, would risk the might of the U.S. military being brought down on Pyongyang. And however pyrrhic an American victory over North Korea would be in combat, the fact remains that Kim Jong-un’s regime would inevitably be annihilated.

For Kim, that’s a scary thought.

Yet for President Trump, the idea that the U.S. military would place its personnel and equipment in the way of a massive North Korean army—to be slaughtered by them—and that U.S. force would not even be paid for by the South Koreans, is anathema. That’s why, for the first time ever, the South Koreans may have a partner in Washington who not only would ignore their development of nuclear weapons. The Trump White House would likely even welcome the South Korean nuclear weapons arsenal, as it would prevent Washington from having to engage in the morally and strategically dubious “tripwire” approach in South Korea.

Trump Would Welcome a South Korean Nuclear Arsenal

After all, if South Korea, one of the world’s most advanced economies with a potent regional military, could truly deter a North Korean attack without needing to rely upon the Americans, that would allow for the United States to refocus its energies on far more pressing geopolitical concerns.

South Korea has the technical proficiency to quickly develop its own nuclear weapons arsenal, as well as advanced ballistic missile delivery systems. In doing so, Seoul could restore the lost sense of deterrence on the peninsula. Rather than waiting—and hoping—that the Americans would protect them from their neighbors to the north, Seoul’s leaders could easily protect themselves.

And although the United States has long sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, the Korean context is such that a South Korean nuclear deterrent would likely not result in a regional arms race. In fact, such steps toward enhanced self-defense could even enhance South Korea’s relationship with America by showing the Trump administration that their Korean allies are a serious player in its own right. What’s more, this move would force Pyongyang to take on a more defensive approach to the South, out of fear that the South Koreans could easily obliterate the regime in response to any North Korean provocation.

But as Kim’s army prepares for an invasion, and Trump questions America’s role on the Korean Peninsula, time for South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons of their own may be running out.

About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.