The Houthis’ Road to Nowhere
Despite rumors of high-level assassinations and the destruction of secret facilities, it is too early to declare the American campaign in Yemen a success. Still, there is reason to believe the Houthis have suffered a significant setback.
A key advantage of the proactive “Axis of Resistance” over the reactive Western powers has been their ability to take the initiative and maintain the element of surprise. Still, the U.S. campaign in Yemen has now reversed that dynamic.
The Houthis are likely in a state of deep strategic confusion. Although the group is committed to supporting Hamas, they cannot predict how long this will keep them in conflict with the United States. Meanwhile, they face mounting domestic crises, including economic collapse and emboldened enemies.
With each passing day, they increasingly resemble their Lebanese Hezbollah mentors, risking their long-term project to avoid the ideological and reputational damage of breaking their pledge to fight alongside Hamas.
The Houthis did pause their attacks on Red Sea shipping and Israel after the Israel-Hamas ceasefire took effect. Still, their leader, Abdelmalek, declared in a televised address that the group was keeping its “finger on the trigger.”
The Houthis’ Crumbling Popularity at Home
When the ceasefire collapsed, after the parties disagreed on how to implement Phase Two or extend Phase One, Israel‘s government announced it would no longer allow aid into Gaza until Hamas released the remaining hostages.
In response, the Houthis recommitted themselves to Hamas‘s cause and declared they would reimpose their “blockade” of Israel-affiliated ships in the Bab al-Mandeb straits.
Before the Yemeni rebels could launch new attacks on Red Sea shipping, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) initiated an extensive bombing campaign across most Houthi-controlled governorates.
The Houthis responded quickly to the U.S. airstrikes by attacking U.S. forces in the region.
Later, when Israel resumed its Gaza offensive after the ceasefire collapsed and Hamas failed to release additional hostages, the Houthis escalated further, launching ballistic missiles directly at Israel again.
The primary goal of U.S. strikes against the Houthis is to restore freedom of navigation. This aligns with the timeline, as the United States launched its attacks after the Houthis declared their intent to “blockade” Israel but before they announced the resumption of direct missile strikes against it.
The Inside Look at American Plans for the Houthis
It also aligns with the content of a leaked Signal discussion, reported by The Atlantic‘s Jeffrey Goldberg, in which Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated that the campaign aims to achieve two objectives:
- Restoring freedom of navigation.
- Reestablishing deterrence.
To restore freedom of navigation, the United States must either compel the Houthis to cease their attacks on maritime traffic or eliminate their ability to continue them. However, given their extremist ideology and their access to an ample supply of varied weaponry, achieving this will require significant time and resources.
So far, the U.S. campaign has reportedly targeted Houthi leaders, weapons stockpiles, and command posts. Those reported killed include the top official in the Houthi missile program, Abdelmalek al-Houthi‘s chief bodyguard, and other regional security officials.
Strikes have hit targets across nearly all fourteen governorates under full or partial Houthi control, highlighting the group‘s dispersed capabilities across vast and mountainous areas. However, the specific targets and results of U.S. strikes remain unclear in most cases.
Some argue that U.S. strikes in Yemen play into the Houthis‘ hands, drawing the United States into a prolonged conflict that bolsters the terrorist group‘s waning popularity and positions it as Yemen‘s defender.
However, there is good reason to be skeptical of this claim. So far, the U.S. campaign has avoided the pitfalls of previous anti-Houthi efforts by minimizing civilian harm, preventing an effective Houthi response, and setting clear, limited objectives. This challenges the Houthi narrative that military actions only strengthen the group while trapping its enemies in an unwinnable quagmire.
As I wrote in mid-January 2025, the Houthis‘ strategic position has declined recently.
Their shift from a ceasefire in 2022 to targeting the global economy and Israel in 2023 failed to boost domestic support. It likely lasted longer than they anticipated when they began their attacks. They entered the post-October 7th conflict, uncertain of its timeline or trajectory. Still, when the Israel-Hamas ceasefire took effect in January 2025, they had a brief opportunity to end this campaign and pivot to other theaters that better served their interests.
However, having tied their fate to Hamas, they found themselves compelled to resume hostilities in March 2025 when the ceasefire collapsed.
This campaign also carries significant implications for Iran. Amid its ongoing military operations in Yemen, the White House has warned Tehran to stop arming the Houthis or face American retaliation for Houthi attacks.
This warning comes as President Trump recently urged Iran to negotiate a nuclear deal in the coming months or risk the military defeat of its nuclear program, using the Yemen conflict as a cautionary example.
While Iran may not shift its stance in response to these threats, enforcing them will become easier once the Houthi threat is degraded.
If the United States remains committed and the Houthis continue on their current trajectory, Washington could significantly weaken, or even defeat, the Houthi regime.
In this context, the Houthis‘ strategic options have narrowed considerably, forcing them to choose between accepting Washington‘s terms or waging a war against a force capable of eroding their regime‘s foundations at minimal cost.
As Napoleon Bonaparte famously said, “Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.”
About the Author: Ari Heistein
Ari Heistein advises Israeli startups seeking to sell to the U.S. federal government, consults on Yemen-related issues, and is a nonresident fellow at the Counter Extremism Project. He has also worked in business development for an Israeli cyber intelligence company and served as a research fellow and chief of staff at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.
Image Credit: Shutterstock/ Mohammed al-Wafi.