The U.S.-Europe Partnership Can’t Be Replaced
Despite heated rhetoric and shifting priorities, the transatlantic alliance between the United States and Europe remains the foundation of global stability.
The economic and military ties between the United States and Europe are historically and geographically unparalleled. Preserving and strengthening these bonds remains a core national interest for both sides. Yet, recent rhetoric at the Munich Security Conference and events since has exposed the fraying emotional bonds that have underpinned the alliance for decades. The most unkind blows have landed on America’s staunchest allies—the Baltics and Poland—who were the first to heed President Donald Trump’s call for increased NATO defense spending.
Rhetoric aside, the transatlantic alliance is underpinned by staggering economic integration, with more than $8 trillion in trade, and by NATO, the most successful military alliance in history. Emotional bonds, once severed, are difficult to reconstitute, however. A shared understanding of the alliance’s purpose and value must be reaffirmed.
For the United States, a strong transatlantic alliance is not just desirable but necessary. It serves as both a ballast and a springboard for American engagement in the Indo-Pacific. In this region, Washington will struggle to replicate the economic and military depth it enjoys in the North Atlantic. European skepticism of American reliability weakens not just NATO, but America’s broader geopolitical position.
For the foreseeable future, Europe’s interests are far better served by an occasionally unreliable American ally than by reliable adversaries such as China and Russia, whose ideological and institutional thrust directly threaten the European way of life. Russia’s hegemonic aggression to subjugate a sovereign Ukraine presents a direct threat to European security. Consequently, European expectations of its American ally to afford greater consideration to its concerns over that of Russia are justified.
For the United States and Europe augmenting transatlantic security should be the paramount concern over any other—including that of Ukraine or Russia—in bringing about an end to the Russo-Ukraine War. Over a hundred years of history teaches that the United States and Europe are stronger together than on their own in dealing with Russia.
President Trump’s express moves have spurred European nations to take greater action and commitment to their own security, with the United Kingdom and France leading the effort to engage Ukraine toward a just and practicable peace. It goes without saying that Ukrainians, above all, and Europeans, in general, desire peace on their continent as do Americans. While the United States and Russia may have greater leverage in ending the war in Ukraine, Europe has the loudest say in securing the peace.
No stable postwar order can be built in Ukraine without Europe’s decisive input—despite the American leadership role in brokering an end to hostilities. Consequently, it behooves the United States to act on its desire for a swift and sustainable peace by integrating the concerns, commitment and participation of all parties involved including Europe, Ukraine and Russia. Weakening of the transatlantic alliance for a hastened cease fire by any party is a poor bargain.
The emotional bonds between America and Europe have eroded since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Without a clear adversary to unite against, both sides embarked on well-intentioned—though often misguided—efforts to reshape the world. In hindsight, these interventions have fostered discontent both at home and abroad. A failure to collectively recognize and respond to new strategic threats has further widened the divide. Now, the time has come for both sides to engage in a frank, mature, and realist dialogue about their national interests—particularly as it concerns individual and collective economic and military security.
Europe may well question Washington’s reasoning in prioritizing engagement with Russia over maintaining strong ties with its European allies. Why would Washington forgo deeper economic ties with the world’s second-largest economy—Europe—to accommodate Russia, an economy that ranks eleventh globally and whose primary exports compete directly with America’s aspirations as the world’s leading energy power? What military advantage does Washington gain by sidelining NATO—a redoubtable alliance that stood by America in Afghanistan—to pursue grand bargains with Moscow, a declared military adversary?
Given the growing structural codependence and complementarity between Chinese and Russian economies and militaries—neither of which exist in their respective engagements with the United States—how may then the United States pry open their no-limits partnership? Why would the U.S. offer rhetorical succor to European political movements adamantly against NATO and greater European defense budgets while favoring Russia and China?
Washington may retort that it has been taken for granted for far too long. For decades, Europe has pursued economic and diplomatic ties with China and Russia—often over U.S. objections. Trump himself, in his first term, suggested that Germany was becoming “totally dependent” on Russian energy—eliciting unmuffled German derision. If European leaders today are uneasy about being caught between Beijing and Washington, should the United States not be equally wary of being dragged into a European contest with Moscow? A Europe that seeks to position itself between American and Russian or Chinese interests introduces as many risks to the alliance as the reverse. Sitting on the geopolitical fence for too long is a dangerous gambit, especially if the ground is shifting beneath it.
The United States has long subsidized European security, allowing Europe to grow its industries, regulate American businesses, expand its welfare state, and point to the absence of such programs in the United States as a critique. At the same time, Washington’s persistent and repeated calls for Europe to assume a fair share of the collective security burden have largely gone unheeded—save for a few nations.
For the foreseeable future, Europe has no alternative to an American security backstop. Moreover, a fully remilitarized Europe, particularly one with large standing French and German armies, raises uncomfortable historical specters and could undermine the extraordinary civilian achievements of the European Union. At the same time, Europe must soberly assess its capacity for economic, political, and social transformation—calls for four-day workweeks, early retirement, and a border carbon tax may appear misplaced in the present geopolitical environment. Whether as an ally or a rival, Europe must be a formidable actor in global affairs.
An open, interest-based transatlantic dialogue is essential to crafting a renewed and equitable Atlantic strategy. The United States and Europe remain the world’s two largest economies, bound by shared ideologies, legal traditions, and deep economic integration. Both benefit far more from deepening these ties than from turning inward or pursuing alternative partnerships. NATO is the most successful military alliance in recorded history. Strengthening it enhances American and European security far more than weakening it ever could. Article 5—the alliance’s collective defense clause—has been invoked only once: in defense of the United States after 9/11.
From the Arctic to the Antarctic, the United States and Europe face shared challenges that demand coordinated responses. A clear-eyed, resolute Atlantic strategy will strengthen both sides as they navigate engagements in the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and the Americas. Misplaced rhetoric and bruised egos aside, no viable alternative exists to a strong transatlantic alliance. Any major deviation from this reality would be grossly irresponsible, negligent, and detrimental to both American and European national interests.
The current tenor of transatlantic rhetoric fails to appreciate America’s unique role in global affairs. The American brand is built on its status as the world’s exceptional and indispensable nation. Its economic and military power make it indispensable. But more than that, it is the idea of America—backed by its conduct and values—that makes it exceptional.
American exceptionalism has been earned through decisive moments in history: liberating and rebuilding Europe and the Asia-Pacific, burying colonialism for good, establishing the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions, defending democracy, defeating Soviet communism, combating global crises from famine to HIV to COVID-19, and through it all standing tall as a beacon of liberty. At every step, American power has expanded by shaping the world in its image. A foreign policy that ignores the deeper values underpinning the American brand, weakens the nation’s long-term interests and standing. Appeasing the aggression of Vladimir Putin or the Taliban does not make America more secure or indispensable—it diminishes its credibility and its exceptionalism.
The value of the American brand extends far beyond its economic and military power—it’s exceptional legacy must be preserved. Few understand the value of a brand better than President Trump. Alongside European leaders such as Ursula von der Leyen, Giorgia Meloni, Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, and the likely incoming German chancellor Friedrich Merz, he is well positioned—beyond rhetorical skirmishes—to revitalize the transatlantic economic and security partnership for the twenty-first century.
Kaush Arha is President of the Free & Open Indo-Pacific Forum and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Krach Institute for Tech Diplomacy at Purdue.
Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com.