Why It’s Time for the U.S. Navy to Take Iran’s Submarine Threat Seriously
The combination of stealth, maneuverability, and firepower makes the Ghadir-class a dangerous threat in specific contexts, particularly in ambush scenarios or anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies.
As forces of the United States military as well as the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) continue their respective buildups in the region—clearly preparing for a massive strike on the Islamic Republic of Iran—the Iranians appear undeterred. Indeed, rather than de-escalating tensions, it appears that forces belonging to Iran’s military are continuing their own counter-buildup in their territorial waters, in preparation for a retaliatory strike.
Indeed, as Tehran prepares for a massive American and Israeli airstrike, it has been enhancing its layered air defense systems. At the same time, Iran’s navy has continued moving elements into strategic waterways, like the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran’s Ghadir-Class Submarine Is No Joke
One such Iranian asset that few people appear to be tracking is Iran’s Ghadir-class diesel-electric submarines. Designed for operations in the shallower waters of the Persian Gulf, these small, stealthy vessels are, like so much of the Iranian Armed Forces, tailored for asymmetrical warfare. First introduced in 2007, these domestically produced submarines are, in fact, a variant of North Korea’s Yono-class midget submarines.
Carrying a crew of around seven and equipped with 533mm torpedo tubes, the Ghadir-class subs are armed with a mix of torpedoes, anti-ship cruise missiles such as the Nasr-1 and Jask-2, and naval mines, providing a versatile offensive capability despite their limited endurance. Some reports suggest they may also be capable of deploying advanced weaponry like Iran’s reverse-engineered Russian Shkval supercavitating torpedo, known as the Hoot, which can reach speeds of up to 200 knots (230 miles) per hour.
The combination of stealth, maneuverability, and firepower makes the Ghadir-class a dangerous threat in specific contexts, particularly in ambush scenarios or anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies.
Iran’s fleet of Ghadir-class submarines number between 14 and 23 units, with production ongoing since 2005. This quantity allows for Iran to deploy them in significant numbers, potentially overwhelming adversaries through sheer volume rather than individual sophistication.
Their primary role appears to be coastal defense and disruption of maritime traffic, aligning with Iran’s broader strategy of deterring foreign naval presence in its home waters.
In fact, one of these submarines was spotted by Western drones moving out of its ports last week, not long after the head of Iran’s Navy claimed they could shut down the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint.
Tiny Ghadir-Class Subs Could Even Threaten U.S. Carriers
Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers belonging to the United States Navy are often deployed in the Persian Gulf or in nearby waters, such as the Gulf of Oman. These carriers represent a prime target for Iran’s naval forces. The Ghadir-class submarines’ ability to threaten American carriers hinges on the submarines’ stealth, armament, and the vulnerabilities of U.S. carriers in confined waterways.
In the Persian Gulf, the shallow and noisy environment favors small submarines like the Ghadir. Their small size allows them to hide in seabed crevices or cluttered coastal waters, evading detection by American anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assets, which are optimized for larger, deep-water threats, like rival nuclear-powered submarines.
And if equipped with the supercavitating torpedoes or even anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), a Ghadir-class submarine could theoretically launch a surprise attack from close range, exploiting the limited maneuverability of a carrier in narrow waters like the Strait of Hormuz.
Interestingly, in previous standoffs with Iran, the U.S. Navy has not hesitated to deploy substantial numbers of its surface warfare fleet into the Strait of Hormuz. Even carriers were deployed to the extraordinarily tight waterway, signaling U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation and flexing American military power in Tehran’s direction. Today, however, with tensions with Iran at their nadir, the American carriers are nowhere to be found.
The carriers’ absence is a tacit admission on the Pentagon’s part. Although U.S. military planners have spoken confidently about carriers’ capabilities—and the ships ought to be capable, given how much they cost—the fact is that they are extraordinarily vulnerable to Iran’s cheap and unsophisticated midget submarines.
The fact that the Navy is keeping its carriers far away from the Strait of Hormuz is an indicator of how hard of a target Iran has become. Indeed, the Harry S. Truman, which is currently deployed to the Red Sea to fight the Houthi rebels in Yemen, is so cowed by Iranian A2/AD systems that it continues to sit well out of range of Houthi missiles. And the Houthis’ A2/AD systems are nowhere near as advanced as the Iranians’ are.
If the Americans tried to deploy their carriers to break any potential Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the carriers would undoubtedly find themselves in a kill box, in which sea mines laid by the Ghadir-class submarines forced the carriers into a predetermined ambush site, with Ghadir-class harassing those carriers with torpedo attacks—all while Iranian land-based A2/AD systems blasted the carriers from above. There would be no way out.
America’s Capacity to Hold Iran Back Is Severely Limited
So the Americans are smart to leave the carriers out of the area. But for a midget submarine—based on a North Korean design, of all things—to keep America’s fleet of expensive carriers out of any fight is quite damning of America’s defense policies.
Iran has striven to make themselves into a porcupine. While U.S. stealth bombers can likely still penetrate their Russian-build air defenses, the Iranians have developed a suite of capabilities that would allow for them to wreak havoc on both the wider region and the U.S. and Israeli forces deployed throughout it.
About the Author: Brandon J. Weichert
Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a contributor at Popular Mechanics, who consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image: Shutterstock / Nick Beer.