The Long History Behind Russia’s Attrition War in Ukraine
Today in Ukraine, the Russian military is pursuing a strategy remarkably similar to that of the past—using its overwhelming numerical superiority in men and weapon systems to achieve goals on the ground.
In the same way a nation or ethnic group shares certain cultural traits, militaries have a certain cultural identity.
Military officers, after all, are inculcated in a certain way of thinking. Their sources of learning hammer in certain values, traits, and doctrines based on history and study. And ways of war differ between nations, based both on their historical precedents and on their current capabilities.
For example, the American way of war hinges on maneuver warfare that surprises, flanks, and destroys an adversary. The U.S. military displayed how effective this style of warfare could be when it reached Baghdad in just 21 days during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. All of this, of course, was aided by America’s considerable airpower, and its long experience of training in combined arms operations.
As military officers progress in their careers, they successively follow, plan, and lead based on these cultural attributes. By the time they hold flag rank, these officers are usually representative of the military culture they came from—although, to be sure, creative and energetic officers will always explore other military cultures for inspiration. As such, when the time comes, it is very likely that high ranking military officers will plan and execute operations based on their culture.
This tendency may help to explain Russia’s current strategic choices in the fields and cities of Ukraine—where it has concentrated its efforts on brutal attrition warfare.
The Russian Way of War
The Russian military’s approach to the Ukrainian conflict aligns with the historical approach of Russian forces in warfare.
The Russian “way of war,” so to speak, weaponizes its historically enormous numbers of available troops to achieve success on the battlefield. To be sure, the history of the Russian military is not simply about numbers. There have been many capable and creative Russian officers who have achieved success, even sometimes numerically inferior forces. However, the Russian way of war heavily emphasizes the number of troops and weapon systems. In Moscow’s precedent, quantity has a quality of its own.
During the First World War, for example, the Tsar’s generals threw literally millions of men against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces. Mobilizing the country’s vast serf population resulted in a huge force. But the Germans and Austro-Hungarians—the latter of which fared little better in the tactical realm—inflicted repeated defeats on Russia, showing that better strategy, equipment, and logistics could outperform larger armies.
During World War Two, Joseph Stalin and the Kremlin mobilized the vast resources of Russia to an unprecedented degree. What would have otherwise been considered catastrophic defeats were seen as an acceptable price for victory by the Russian forces.
For instance, during the first few months of Operation Barbarossa, Nazi Germany’s invasion of Russia, the Soviet forces lost millions of men killed or captured. At the city of Kyiv (then known as Kiev), the Germans surrounded the city and destroyed an entire Soviet Front. Altogether, the Soviet Union lost approximately 700,000 men in that defeat. By the end of the war, the Russian forces had lost as many as 20 million troops. Yet the Russian military was even stronger than it was before the war began.
Russia’s Attritional Strategy Is Working in Ukraine
Today in Ukraine, the Russian military is pursuing a strategy remarkably similar to that of the past—using its overwhelming numerical superiority in men and weapon systems to achieve goals on the ground.
Currently, these goals are all about territory. Russian President Vladimir Putin wants as much Ukrainian territory as possible before any peace settlement. Accordingly, the Russian military exchanges men for territory. While it might be seen as odd and cynical to the average Western observer, the Russian military is doing exactly what it knows how to do.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
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